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Abstract 
THE Lro.ACY OF 
THE THREE PRESIDENCIES OF ARNULFO ARIAS MADRID 
by 
Sandra Blackman 
Arnulfo Arias Madrid colored the history of Panama with his eccen-
tric, jingoistic, and often humorous escapades. His presidencies were 
brief, but provided a lasting influence on the country's political system. 
Arias formed the first really cohesive political party, made up 
largely of the Panamanian middle class. The party has survived more than 
four decades, unlike any other p:>litical party in that country. It has, 
however, changed its name with the times. Arias ostensibly based his 
party on long-term national goals, but once in off ice sought to advance 
his personal interests and to centralize power. In so doing he deprived. 
Panamanians of the opp:>rtunity to develop a true democratic, two-party or 
multi-party system. This pattern has been repeated over and over again 
in Latin America. The ~audillQ, strong man, attains power based on the 
needs and desires of his party members. Once in power the ~gUdillQ 
forgets the reason for the struggle arx:1 his roots. 
In addition, Arias set a dangerous precedent--that of instability--
when he led the first successful coup against a duly-elected government. 
It was only awropriate that this chapter of Panamanian republicanism 
ended with a military coup against Arias. 
This is an attempt to examine the effects of Panama's foremost 
kal.ldillQ on the p:>litical life of the country. 
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THE LmACY OF THE THREE PRESIDEOCIF.s OF ARNULFO ARIAS MADRID 
Panamanian politics for the first sixty-five years since indepen-
dence have been shaped by colorful figures who have been able to wield 
power and influence events even when not holding ];Ublic office. Men such 
as Belisario Porras, Rudolfo Chiari, Arnulfo Arias, Jo~ Antonio Rem6n 
Cantera, and Omar Torrijos emerged as true ~miaiJ.lQ12-poi;ular strongmen. 
One of the most recognizable, however-nationally and internationally-
has been Arias, perhaps because the others have been unable to evoke the 
same love-hate passion from the p>pulace. On three separate occasions it 
has been his terrible fate to fail to remain in off ice for a complete 
presidential term. Be has held the presidency for as long as seventeen 
months; his shortest term-eleven days-has served as his last. He has 
served as a major political force for more than twenty-five years and 
has become a significant contributing factor in the evolution of the 
Panamanian middle class into an imp>rtant i;x>litical group. 
An examination of Arias as a catalyst would be incomplete without a 
look at his personal life. Arnulfo's handsome visage might have best 
suited a Hollywood film star of the day. His extraordinary good looks 
gave him the appearance of a man more at home on the stage or in front 
of the camera than in the operating room or on the campaign trail. John 
Gunther, during his visit to the Isthmus in 1940, met the Panamanian presi-
dent and described him as "suave, confident, vivid, and ambitious.•1 
These qualities, along with charm arx1 charisma, made him attractive to the 
1John Gunther, lngide-Latin AmeJ:iQa (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1941) I P• 147. 
1 
2 
masses in general and to women in particular. 
Arias' humble beginnings proved to be another imi;x>rtant factor in his 
appeal to the masses. His forebears settled in the Penonom~ region1 
sometime during the eighteenth century; and Antonio, Arnulfo's father, 
moved to the hamlet of R{o Grande (Penonome) during early adulthood. 
There he began a cattle ranch. Prior to marrying carmen Madrid, Antonio 
sowed a seemingly extensive crop of wild oats, and brought to life four 
children, one of them Nazaria. Carmen and Antonio reared nine children, 
eight from their marriage and Nazaria, who was regarded as the eldest. 
Arnulfo, the youngest of the siblings, became his mother's favorite. 
Because their family was by no means moneyed, carmen found it necessary 
to sacrifice much to see to it that her golden boy received an excellent 
education. The father provided an encouraging environment for learning 
by giving his children the best in literature, at times ordering books 
from abroad. His sons attended the local Roman Catholic Brothers school 
for their elementary studies. At the age of thirteen Arnulfo went to 
Panama City where he attended junior high school while residing in the 
home of older brother Harmodio. Later, through the efforts of his mother, 
he transferred to Harwick College in New York. This involved a major 
sacrifice for the Arias' because at that time only wealthy Panamanians could 
afford to study abroad. It was while studying in New York that he sustained 
an injury which almost cost him his life and labeled him for the rest of 
1Penonome is one of the nine provinces of Panama, and is one of the 
central provinces. It is second only to Chiriqu! province in agricultural 
and cattle output. 
his existence.I 
3 
Because he excelled in sports as well as academically, he became an 
active soccer player at Harwick. During a game Arnulfo sustained a 
severe injury and underwent surgery on one of his testicles. As a re-
sult his detractors and enemies have referred to him by the rather bawdy 
and emasculating term of el hombre ce un cojon..2 It did not, however, 
diminish his attractiveness to members of the fairer sex.3 
When Arnulfo, nicknamed Fuf o, returned to the Isthmus for a short 
period of rest and recuperation, he witnessed the occupation of Panama 
City and Colon by troops of the United States Army as the result of 
unrest following the local elections of 1918. Article 136 of the Pana-
manian Constitution of 1903 granted the United States the right to 
intervene in any part of the republic in the event the public peace was 
disturbed. This traumatic experience partly shaped Arias' attitude to-
ward the United States during his first year in office.4 
He returned to the United States to finish his studies at Harwick 
and continued on at the University of Chicago, where he received his 
1Louise Blackman, interviews held in Panama City, Panama, August 
1980. Blackman is an immigrant from the West Indies and an eyewitness 
to many of the events. Eduardo Charles, interview held in Panama City, 
Panama, 22 September 1980. Charles is a former mayor of Panama City. His 
political mentor, Heliodoro Patino, was one of Arnulfo Arias' most strident 
opponents; however, Charles is able to provide one of the few unbiased 
views of Arias. Jose Conte-Porras, AtnulfcLAtias_Maerig (Panama 
City: Li tho Impresora Panama, S.A., 1980), p. 23. 
2The man with the one testicle. 
3Blackman, interviews; Charles, interviews; Conte-Porras, Arnulfo, 
p. 23. 
4Article 136 was often invoked by the party in power to control the 
actions of the opposition and was also instrumental in setting a prece-
dent for the Panamanian military to intervene in IX>litical matters. 
4 
bachelor of science degree. Arnulfo then attended the medical school at 
Harvard University.1 
During his residency in surgery at Boston City Hospital in 1925, 
his father died. Arnulfo, however, did not attend the funeral or return 
to console his mother, to whom he was very close. He later went on to 
Paris for additional training in surgical practices. This apparent 
dedication to medicine makes it difficult to understarXJ his passion for 
politics--a passion that forced the relegation of medicine to a sec-
ondary position in his life. By 1926 he was back in Panama, practicing 
medicine at the Santo Tomas public hospital and endearing himself to the 
masses by providing heal th care free to those unable to pay. 2 
At this µ>int it becomes necessary to diverge from the main theme 
and examine Harmodio Arias and his influence on his younger brother 
because it was at this juncture that Arnulfo underwent a change in p.lr-
pose, and it appears that Harmodio's ideas arXl activities were at least 
partly responsible. 
In 1926 the United States arrl Panama made the first major attempt 
to revise the Hay-Bunau-Var ill a Treaty. 3 The revision, known as the 
Kellogg-Alfaro Convention, was never ratified by the Panamanian govern-
ment because of an intense campaign launched by Harmodio Arias and Accion 
Comunal, a civic group which consisted largely of me.stimQ, members of 
1conte-Porras, Arnulfo, W• 23-24. 
2Ibid, p. 24. 
3with the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty Panama granted the United States 
control over the land and waters that would be used to build the Panama 
Canal and establish the Panama Canal Zone. 
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the professional middle class, artisans, and shop owners. As individuals 
the members of this group found themselves excluded from power. Their 
primary goal was to form a political organization to challenge the oli-
garchy. The middle' class was, and still is, the most nationalistic 
sector of the populace.1 
Harmodio's story is somewhat similar to that of Arnulfo. He re-
ceived his law degree from the London School of Economics in 1911. The -
thesis he wrote proposed the internationalization of the Panama canal. 
Harmodio later became publisher of one of the most widely circulated 
newspapers on the Isthmus, El Panama=Am~iQa; in addition he established 
a successful law practice. Most of his time during these early years, 
however, was spent dabbling in politics. John and Mavis Biesanz, 
authors of ~.e~l.e1LQf Pan.am.a, described Harmodio as a "shrewd and 
calculating manipulator, a fomentor of trouble."2 At the time they 
published their work they credited him with having •tremendous power 
over public opinion and • • • [being] responsible for much of what 
happens in Panama."3 While Harmodio became involved in politics first, 
the two brothers joined forces in late 1930, when Arnulfo also developed 
an interest in politics. 
1conte-Porras, ~nulfo, El>- 24-25; Walter Lafeber, Tbe_Panama..caDal.i. 
Xb.e_Ciisis_in_Bist~al-l?e~P.ekti~.e (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979), IP• 80-81; Lester Langley, "Negotiating New Treaties with Panama: 
1936, • BispgniQ...Am.eiikmi.llistail&aLBeJzi.eH 48 (May 1968): 221. 
2John a00 Mavis Biesanz, Tbe_P.eoples_of Panama (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1955), p. 140; Dr. Harmodio Arias was among the group 
of Panamanian lawyers licensed to practice before the now defunct Bar of 
the Ancon District Court on the Canal Zone. He, more than any other, 
actually practiced before the Court quite actively until the 1930s. Xb.e 
Sund.a~epubl.ik, 25 April 1982 (Panama). 
3Biesanz, Peoples, p. 140. 
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The relationship between the two brothers, however, is enigmatic. 
There is no doubt that Arnulfo received his grooming from Harmodio, but 
in 1941 Harmodio became one of the loudest denouncers of the actions of 
his brother, President Arnulfo Arias. Conte-Porras, one of President 
Arias' biographers, states that individuals close to both described the 
filial relationship as one of "respectful cordiality."1 Whatever this 
may mean, it may be the best term to define their attitudes toward each 
other. 
At first working closely together, however, the brothers launched 
their major opening attack on the political system early in 1931 when 
they overthrew the government of President Florencio Harmodio Arosemena 
in the the first successful golpe de estado in Panamanian history. Ex-
pres iden t Rudolfo Chiari, whose aristocratic and moneyed family had 
dominated the presidency for years, had hand-picked his successor--
Arosemena. Arnulfo Arias, heading a band of renegades, initiated an 
armed attack at 2:40 a.m. on 2 January against the presidential palace, 
Palacio de las Garzas. Once they had over-powered the guards, he arxl an 
aide, Dr. Ramon Mora, forced Arosemena to resign. Arias, thereupon, be-
came an overnight hero arXI champion of the masses, having dealt a blow 
to the oppressive Panamanian oligarchy. 2 
Harmodio Arias replaced Arosemena. Secorxl vice-president Tomas 
Gabriel Duque, whose ties with Chiari were close and whose family owned 
the major newspaper (~e.J~anaroa...StaLBei.:alg) was forced to seek asylum 
1conte-Porras, AtDUlfQ, R?• 24-25. 
2Ibid, p. 27; Lafeber, ~e-Panama_canal, pp. 80-81. 
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in the canal Zone--then a haven for Panamanian polticians fallen out of 
grace. First vice-president Ricardo J. Alfaro-then away in Washington, 
D.C.-returned late January of 1932 to take the oath of office. Alfaro 
served his country not only as president but also as its foremost diplomat, 
historian, and expert on international law. He assumed the presidency 
in exchange for assisting Harmodio to become the chief executive in 1932.1 
During the elder Arias' presidency (1932-1936), Panama negotiated a 
revision of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty-the Hull-Alfaro accord-and 
the National University was founded. The university since then has 
provided opportunities for members of the middle class to obtain a 
higher education at minimal cost. Harmodio named his brother-in-law, 
Octavio Menrlez Pereira, one of Panama's foremost educators, first presi-
dent of the National University. Mendez Pereira continued in that post, 
with the exception of the periods he lived in exile, until he died in 
1954. As a reward for his part in the successful gQlJ;?e Arnulfo Arias was 
appointed minister to Italy.2 
By 1932 Panama, like the rest of the world, became another victim in 
the throes of a serious economic depression with a need for new sources 
of revenue. Despite the large market in the canal Zone, Panamanian busi-
nessmen could not compete with the commissaries, and, in fact, lost cus-
tamers in the Rep.iblic because of the contrabarxl material from these re-
tail stores. In addition, the large number of jobless former Canal 
lconte-Porras, !InulfQ, p. 75. 
2Biesanz, Tba.J?eoples_gf_Eanama, p. 155, and Larry L. Pi win, The 
BemQn....Eia.L An Anal2sia.Qf a ~ade_QL~s_jn..Panama-19.4.Z=J.9.51 (Stan-
ford, CA: Institute of Hispanic American and Luse-Brazilian Studies, 
1964) I P• 19. 
8 
laborers exacerbated the country's unemployment problem. Harmodio Arias 
explored several solutions, including •a moratorium on the national 
debt, a savings bank, and a reduction in civil service salaries;" these, 
however, did not improve conditions markedly. The president came to the 
conclusion that any major amelioration of the predicament should and 
perhaps necessarily would involve a larger participation of Panamanians 
in the benefits afforded by the eana1.1 
On his visit to the United States in October 1933, Harmodio Arias 
discussed the dilemma with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who proved 
to be quite willing to grant a number of concessions. The Panamanian 
President, though, was not quite satisfied, fearing that the memorandum 
which resulted from the talks might be abrogated by another United States 
presidential administration. He pressed for further talks and sent his 
envoy, Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro, to conduct negotiations. Alfaro then be-
came responsible for negotiating of the first successful revision of the 
Hay-Bunau-Varilla agreement.2 
Dr. Alfaro and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, along with Pana-
manian envoy Narciso Garay and United States presidential advisor Sumner 
Welles, signed the Convention of Friendship arx1 Cooperation on 2 March 
1936. The United States gave up the obligation to guarantee Panamanian 
independence, along with the right to intervene in Panama City and Col6n 
to maintain order. The United States increased the annual rental paid to 
Panama from $250,000.00 to $430,000.00, and relinquished the right to 
annex additional lands or waters without Panama's prior consent, as 
lLangley, "Negotiating New Treaties,• p. 222. 
21bid., PP• 222-224. 
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previously granted in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla pact. A number of economic 
concessions were granted to Panamanian businessmen, among them the 
opportunity to bid on supply contracts in the Canal Zone. The Panamanian 
government received the right to tax its citizens living and working in 
the Canal Zone and to control over the immigration of aliens entering 
Panama as laborers through the canal Zone. The United States aixl Panama 
also discussed a proposal by which the Washington government would 
provide funds to aid in the repatriation of many unemployed alien lab-
orers attracted earlier to the Isthmus by work on the Canal but who later 
became little more than an exacerbation of the unemployment crisis.I 
During this entire period, 1934 to 1938, Arnulfo Arias served as 
minister to Italy. It is said that while serving in Europe he developed 
his pro-fascist political views. Perhaps so, for at some time in his 
stay on that continent he met with Adolf Hitler and was believed to have 
reached an understanding concerning Isthmian relationships with Berlin 
and Rome before returning to Panama in 1938.2 
Once back on the Isthmus he instigated campaigns against United 
States-owned aixl Canadian-owned businesses. As a result, banks such as 
the National City Bank and Chase National Bank found themselves compelled 
to move their offices to the canal Zone. 
Arnulfo also organized a coalition which included members of the 
oligarchy sympathetic to the fascist regimes in Europe arXl the ever ex-
panding nationalistic Panamanian middle class. He was by this time dubbed 
1 Ibid., p. 229; Samuel ~ Rosenman, ed., Xbe_PUbli~_P.apeuL.amLA'1= 
~.ee.s_gf..E.umkli~.ee¥elt, vol. II (New York: Random House, 1938), 
pp. 407-410. 
2Lafeber, Xbe..Pan.allla....C.anaJ., p. 92; t'.Iel!l..YQ.tJLXime.e, 12 October 1941. 
~ oombte because of his charisma.! 10 
Arnulfo Arias embodies the ideal ~WJ.l.Q, a class of leader whose 
rule based on personalism is often considered endemic to Latin America. 
The following characteristics outlined by Jose Conte-Porras in the work 
Arnulfo Arias Madrid illustrate this: 
1. In an effort to gain the SUP{X>rt of the masses the ~WJ.J.g 
tries to dissociate himself fran the established ruling classes. 
2. The strong man, usually a product of the rural lower class, 
after having gained power by a struggle outside of the accepted 
means will fiOO it necessary to introduce a new set of rules to 
maintain authority. 
3. Be uses such p:>pulist p:>litical neasures as plebiscites to give 
an appearance of democracy and equality to the regime. 
4. The worship bestowed up:>n the strongman is the result of a 
fanaticism bred by struggles within that society and his suc-
cess is in direct proportion to the ill-feeling brought to bear 
against the established institutions. 
5. The ~illa represents the unconscious ideals of the masses 
and is2 often able, over an extensive period of time, to realize these. 
While this list probably is not exhaustive, it is a fact that Arnulfo 
Arias met all of these conditions, and, for that matter, still does. 
The Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party) 
formed earlier by Arnulfo Arias, offered him the presidential candidacy 
for that party in 1939. In his acceptance speech he declared, "In Panama 
there should exist, germinate, and develop only one creed, only one 
doctrine, only one director, our pgnameffi~.·3 
1Laf eber, ~Panama canai, p. 93. 
2eonte-Porras, AtDlllfQ, pp. 9-10. 
3Ibid., p. 87. ~SIW was the label Arnulfo Arias gave to his 
brand of nationalism. 
11 
#V 
As a platform, panamenismo proved exceptionally popular, and in 
1940 Arnulfo came to power in a sweeping electoral victory. This was the 
second time the Arias brothers had challenged the oligarchy and had won. 
Make no mistake: the political system was corrupt, and generally only 
those candidates with certain personal or familial connections were 
elected. The members of this clique all belonged to the posh Union Club 
of Panama City. The Arias brothers, however, existed outside of this 
Union Club circle. Dr. Ricardo Alfaro, the hand-picked successor of 
President Augusto Boyd and Arnulfo's opponent, headed a coalition of 
liberals and socialists.1 Arias defeated Alfaro only after a series of 
disorders incited by his followers caused Alfaro to be discredited and to 
withdraw from the race. 
Arnulfo enjoyed an apparent landslide victory-107, 750 to 3,022-but 
this was not a mandate, because the supporters of Alfaro had boycotted 
the elections. Just the same, Arias' ability to tap the country's recent-
ly developed feeling of nationalism and anti-Americanism gained him the 
presidency through this ix>litical victory.2 
As a member of the middle class, he broke the oligarchical tradi-
N 
tion by advancing a new ideology called pgoamenismo-government by and 
for the happiness of Panamanians. What led to this sentiment is perhaps 
best expressed by the Panamanian p:>et Demetrio Korsi in the following 
poem, "Una vision de Panama:"3 
1President Harmodio Arias served as chief executive until September 
1936 and was succeeded by President Augusto Boyd in one of the few smooth 
presidential transitions in Panamanian history. Harmodio Arias retired 
to private life but remained active in politics. 
2Lafeber, ~be.-J?anama...canaJ., p. 93; Charles, interviews. 
3Jose Jimenez, "Una vision de Panama," AotQlgg!a_de_la_pges!g_bis= 
panoane.ri~ana_~QDtelDPQ.ran.ea (Madrid: Alianza Filitorial, 1970), p. 28. 
Gringos, gringos, gringos • • • Negros, negros, negros • • • 
Tiendas y almacenes, cien razas al sol. 
Cholitas cuadradas y zaf ias mulatas 
llenan los zaguanes de prostitucion. 
Un cocbe decrepito pasa con turistas. 
Soldados, marinas, que vienen y van, 
y, empantalonadas, las cabaretistas 
que aqu! ban descubierto la tierra de Adan. 
Panamcl la facil, Panama la abierta, 
Panamcl la de esa Avenida Central 
que es encrucijada, puente, p.ierto y puerta 
ix>r donde debiera entrarse al Canal. 
Movimiento. Tratico. Todas las cantinas, 
todos las borrachos, todos las fox-trots, 
y todas las runt>as y todos los grajos 
y todas los gringos que nos manda Dios. 
Diez mil extranjeros y mil billeteras • • • 
Aguardiente, milsica •••• La guerra es fatal! 
Danzan los millones su danza macabra. / 1 Gringos, negros, negros, gringos • • • .Panama! 
1This is a simple translation: "A View of Panama" 
Gringos, gringos, gringos • • • Negroes, negroes, negroes 
Shops and stores, every human race Wlder the sun. 
Sturdy Indian lasses and unsophisticated mulatto girls 
Fill our vestibules with harlotry. 
A decrepit car passes with tourists. 
Soldiers, sailors, that come and go, 
and, pantalooned, the showgirls 
who have here discovered the promised land. 
Panama the easy, Panama the open, 
Panama of that Central Avenue 
that is crossroads, bridge, port and doorway 
by which to enter the Canal. 
Movement, traffic. All the barroans. 
All the drllllks, all the foxtrots, 
and all the rurrbas, and all the unwashed armpits, 
and all the gringos God sends us. 
Ten thousand foreigners and a thousand lottery sellers 
Firewater, music •••• War is deadly! 
Millions dance their dance macabre 
Gringos, negroes, negroes, gringos • • • Panama! 
• • • 
12 
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The native's position in his country was being usurped by foreigners, 
especially gi=inga.e arXi jamaiQanQ.e-Americans and West Indian blacks. 
In his inaugural address, Arnulfo denounced the belief that all men 
are born free and equal. The nation's racial strain needed improvement. 
Arias set out to accanplish this by calling for a more selective system 
of im:nigration aI¥l criticizing the entrance through the canal Zone of large 
nunbers of blacks. Be also stated the need for continued friendship with 
the United States arx:l spoke of constitutional reform. 1 
The Panamanians who elected him did so expecting changes in the 
distribution of the national wealth. The ~anelli.etas, his party's 
manbers, were mainly former members of Accion Comunal, teachers, shop-
owners, and government workers. Racially they belonged to the me.sti.zc 
grouping. They were prepared for a takeover of the ownership of the retail 
businesses because there was much talk about a new constitution since 
the elections, and they were not disapi;x>intea.2 
Seventeen days after his inauguration, Arias presented the hastily 
written new constitution to the National Assembly, Panama's legislature. 
It met with an enthusiastic reception. The government under the new charter 
would be democratic and unitarist with emphasis on the latter. The con-
stitution increased the presidential term from four to six years, begin-
ning with the incunbent, and broadened his powers. It guaranteed the 
continued ownership of private property acquired within the boundaries 
of the law. This property, however, was subject to expropriation by the 
government in the event of a war. Property could be seized for PJblic 
1NeltLYQIL~.e, 6 October 1940. 
2Biesanz, Peoples, p. 140. 
14 
use or in the interest of society, with indemnity of course, but the ulti-
mate decision as to whether or not the individual received adequate 
remuneration would be Arias'. In the event the president found it neces-
sary, the owners might receive no compensation whatsoever. The govermnent 
could establish monopolies as a means of raising revenues, and it could 
operate utility companies and set prices in the private sector for the 
welfare of the masses. The constitution guaranteed freedan of speech, 
press, assembly, and religion, am recognized the Roman catholic religion 
as that of the majority of the population.1 
An acXlitional clause calling for the denationalization of children 
of Asiatics and blacks whose original language was not Spanish was pre-
sented to the assembly on 22 Novanber 1940 arx:I was approved by that body. 
These racial minorities were alien groups within society. It is said 
that Arias discriminated against Antillean blacks because they did not 
integrate into the mainstream of the nation's daily life. They remained 
detached and uninvolved, and whenever a crisis developed they chose to 
consider themselves as subjects of the British Crown and therefore not 
subject to Panamanian ways am laws. Their refusal to learn Spanish and 
give up English especially irked Panamanians. The main cause of fricticn 
was not language or mores, however, but the fact that blacks were al-
lowed to irranigrate through the canal Zone and there did the jobs many 
Panamanians were reluctant to perform. Thus the West Indians were seen 
as depriving the Isthmians of their wealth.2 
1~w_YaI1Ltilres, 18 October 1940; Panama CQnfltitutiQn, 1941; Conte--
Porras, ALnulfQ, p. 87. 
2~lLYaI1Ltilres, 23 Novanber 1940; Panama ConfltitutiQD, 1941; Conte--
Porras, ALnulfQ, p. 94; Langley, ~~Ieatiefl, p. 221. 
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Arias promulgated what he named the •1aw to protect the integrity 
of the Spanish language.• Spanish, he felt, was a synbol of Panamanian 
sovereignty over its territory. At that time the major newspaper avail-
able in Panama was the StaL.alXLBe.taJ.d, owned and operated by the Duque 
family. The newspaper was printed mainly in English with a Spanish 
language supplement. The president requested that the Duques reverse 
this and they acceded. Presently the EQYella_Qe_p~ PJblishes more 
than twice the volwne of pages of the Star and HeialaL E'iluardo Charles, 
former mayor of Panama City and a Panamanian of West Indian descent, is 
one of a growing nunber of persons in the Republic woo sees this as an 
advance and a gain in national self-esteem. He feels Arias' step was 
significant in bringing younger blacks of Antillean heritage into the 
mainstream of Panamanian life.1 
" Jose Pezet, chairman of the National Assembly and in 1940 Arias' 
first vice-president, urged that a plebiscite be held on 15 Decarber 1940 
to ratify the new constitution. The proposed new constitution abolished~ 
all but Article 137 of the 1903 document, which provided for amendments. 
The most vociferous opponent of this new Panamanian magna carta was 
older brother Harmodio, who saw it as an erosion of democratic principles 
beca~ it allowed the government to intervene in the private sector and 
to establish monopolies. Arnulfo then sought to allay such fears by 
giving assurances that foreigners' rights would be respected.2 
On 15 Decenber 1940, Panamanians went to the polls as was expected 
of than am approved the constitution by an overwhelming majority of 
1conte-Porras, Atnulfa, p. 94; Charles, interviews. 
2~~~ime~, 23 and 27 Novent>er 1940. 
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votes--144,312 to 1,865. Those opposing later complained of instances 
during the day when the ID ballots were not available at sane locations. 
The Supreme Court, however, upheld the validity of the plebiscite and 
gave its blessings on 29 December 1940. It went into effect on 2 January 
1941.1 
A few JOOnths earlier, in June 1940, most of the city of Colon had 
been devastated by a fire that deprived many people of their homes and 
livelihoods. Many believed the reason for the arson, and it was unques-
tionably arson, was to divest the foreigners of their shops. But many sur-
vived and business went on as usual. 2 
The decisive blow to Panama's foreign business conmunity, however, 
came on 14 February 1941, when the National Assenbly passed a bill 
barring aliens fran the operation of all retail businesses. Citizenship 
became a prerequisite for owning these. Foreigners owned most of the 
country's retail stores. United States citizens owned the largest i;:ortion 
of the bars and many other establishments for the sale of liquor. They 
were also involved in other branches of the retail trade. The bill also 
affected foreign restaurant and hotel owners. Chinese, Jews, and East 
Indians operated many grocery, dry goods, and general stores in towns 
and villages throughout the country. Of this group the Chinese would be 
hardest hit. The new bill also banned foreigners from operating as 
commission merchants and fuel distributors.3 
l~~m:~s, 16 aoo 30 December 1940. 
2Blackman, interviews. 
3~e~Ik Xines, 15 February 1941; Blackman, interviews. 
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Another bill introduced in the assanbly that same day regulated the 
granting of gambling concessions. North Americans, as stated earlier, 
controlled most of the casinos, bars, and hotels-the major gambling 
establishments. The bill contaired clauses permitting the cabiret to de-
fine gambling. This measure allowed high officials in government to line 
their p:>ckets,1 the perennial reason for entering politics in Panama.2 
The same motivation that led Arias to deprive Asiatics and blacks 
born in Panama of citizenship arXi full protection llllder the law led him 
to divest foreigners of their businesses; it appeared that they ex-
ploited Panamanian wealth while the native megti.zg was denied this 
right. This was not really true because there was opportunity for all 
those willing to work hard. Arias also urged Isthmians to boycott estab-
lisbnents that did not use the language of the nation or that displayed signs 
prominently in English. This was just another of his several measures to 
reinforce the idea of Panamanian sovereignty.3 
He also made other changes to increase the self-estean of the EX>P-
ulation. The president eliminated the Pitr..MunW._Benefit;iQ mtto from the 
national emblem and replaced it with the theme, BQDQIL_Jugti~i~ 
L~i:tac. The new theme rejected the concept of Panama as a country of 
transit arxl corrmerce, a stigma that had plagued the nation since colonial 
times.4 
11n order to comply with the standards defined by the cabinet and 
thereby receive a garct>ling license the casino owner would have to bribe 
some high official. 
21'le~LJ!:Ql:~imes, 15 February 1941. 
3eonte-Porras, Ainulfo, p. 94. 
4He~QI~s, 15 February 1941. 
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Other measures included granting the right to vote to professional 
women even though they made up a very small percentage of the female IX>P-
ulation; establishing the i&t.t:imoiQ_fgmilia.t:, the precursor of the 
agrarian reform of the early 1960s, and creating the caja de Seguro 
Social, Panama's social security system. Unlike that of the United 
States, the beneficiary does not have to wait until retirement to avail 
himself of the medical plan. In the area of land reform, Arias made the 
first attempt at equitable redistribution of the nation's land; but he 
dealt it a damning blow during his second presidency.1 
While instituting these beneficial measures, Arias also attempted 
to create a police state by revamping the National Guard in December 
1940. Be replaced Colonel Manuel Pino, wlx> resigned on 19 December 1940, 
and offered him a diplomatic post. Be named Julio Bricen'o head of the 
/ Guard, but the de facto leader was Colonel Fernando G6mez Ayau, a dis-
ciple of Guatemala's heavy-handed strongman, General Jorge Ubico. Arnul-
fo also comnited a serious error at this roint an:i earned the lifetime 
enmity of Jose Antonio Remon cantera. Ranon was only an underling in the 
National Guard. He had been ousted from the force in 1935 by Barmodio 
and in December 1940 he was sent abroad by Arnulfo, ostensibly for addi-
tional military training. Translated, this simply meant exile.2..; 
This revamping of the guard was partly responsible for President 
Arnulfo Arias' defeat in 1941 and again in 1968. Be made many of the 
officers doubtful of the security of their situation and unwilling to 
cooperate with him. They felt he was trespassing in their domain am 
1conte-Porras, Atnulfg, p. 93. 
2New York Times, 21 December 1940; Pippin, XillLBeil.lSILE.ta, El>• 7, 18. 
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they soon helped to rectify the situation. The secret of success of many 
past presidents was their willingness to allow the National Guard to 
operate with a certain degree of independence and, of course, reliance 
on guard supIX>rt in any difficult situation. Arnulfo tried to weaken 
this official organ while strengthening his private militia headed by 
G6mez Ayau. When he was ousted in 1941 they did not provide him with any 
support to regain the presidency.1 
Another area in which Arias failed was in the relationship between 
his regime and the United States. The new constitution gave Panama the 
right of an~nt domain over all its territory: land, air, territorial 
waters, merchant ships, warships, and other areas and objects within its 
boundaries. He now challenged the United States. The constitution gave 
the president the right to nationalize land or property as he saw fit. Al-
though Arias' regilre was in no way able to nationalize the canal am the 
Canal Zone, adding this clause to the constitution deIX>nstrated a willing-
ness to do so. Friction between the United States government am Arias 
came, not as a result of the canal issue, but from his opIX>sition to arming 
United States-owned ships flying the Panamanian flag and his threat to stop 
such vessels fran sailing to war zones. Earlier, when it became obvious 
the United States would become involved in the Second World War, Washing-
ton requested the lease of sites for the establisl'ment of defense facili-
ties in Panama. Arias succeeded in fanenting so much anti-American 
feeling that the Panamanian p.lblic refused to grant the leases in perpetuity.2 
1Piwin, 'I'be RerW'tLEia, p. 18. 
2Lawrence o. Ealy, The RePJbli~LPanama in World Affai.r~L-12.03= 
l~50 (Pittsburgh: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951, reprint, West-
port, er: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1970), H?• 105-126, passim. 
20 
Arias' many changes, restrictions, and pronouncements also fright-
ened and antagonized the oligarchy. They became irritated by his con-
stant demands for contributions and worried by his increasing suppres-
sion of the free press. Even Hannodio, his brother, denounced him. In 
fact, a vicious rivalry developed between Harmoclio and Arnulfo in 1941. 
There was constant mention of Arnulfo's wrongdoing in El ~-.&nedka, 
where Harmodio accused the president of, among other things, being under 
the domination of Hitler.1 
While these allegations were being made during September 1941, two 
United States-owned, Panamanian-registered merchant ships were sunk by 
German u-boats. Arias' reaction (on 6 October) was to let it be known 
that he would not allow Panamanian ships to be fitted with artillery 
because this would violate their neutral status. Something would have to 
give, and it soon did.2 
The morning following this apparently pacifistic pronouncement, 
Arias boarded a plane for Havana to visit his oculist. This proved to be 
his undoing. His absence coupled with growing dissatisfaction with his gov-
ermnent led to the g~e_eQtaaQ that overthrew him on 9 October 1941. 
One question arises whenever this event is discussed among Panamani-
ans: Who engineered the coup? Many, including Arnulfo, blame the United 
States. There is no doubt regarding assistance by the United States. It 
was not coincidental that after his refusal to allow Panamanian ships to 
carry guns, the National Assembly aIXl other government officials 
1conte-Porras, Arnulfo, p. 100. 
2Ealy, BePJblic of Panama, W· 105-126, passim.; Conte-Porras, 
ArnJJlfQ, P• 102; ~lLYQik TimeQ, 9 and 11 October 1940. 
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received information on the whereabouts of Arias, data available only to 
the United States Army. The president left for Havana using the airfield 
at France Field in the Canal Zone on the morning of the 7th to visit his 
oculist, although many contend it was to meet with his mistress-Cuban 
artist Anita de la Vega. The military chief of intelligence in the canal 
Zone, captain Paul Mcintyre, advised the Minister of Goverrunent and 
Justice, Ricardo de la Guardia, that the president had left the country. 
The accusatioos of the United States' involvanent become insignificant 
when finding a reason for the coup against Arias.1 Ultimately he alone 
became responsible for his overthrow. Arnulfo alone wrote the constitution 
of 1941. It required that the president notify the National Asseii::>ly and 
have the first vice-president sworn into off ice whenever the president 
intended to leave the country. This he did not do. His wife, when ques-
tioned, stated that he was on the high seas dee~sea fishing with 
friends. The secretary of the president claimed Arias was on a trip to 
the San Blas Indian Reservation. The president's absence became obvious 
and no one seemed to know or appeared to be willing to tell exactly 
where he was.2 
With the resulting gal~ on the 9th of October, Ernesto Jaen Guard-
ia, the second vice-president, was sworn into off ice as president of the 
Rep.iblic. First Vice-President Jose Pezet, whose views too closely re-
sanbled those of Arias, was jailed.3 
1Ne~ork Tine~, 10 October 1941; Conte-Porras, &nulfQ, p. 103. 
2He~Q~~' 10 October 1941; Conte-Porras, AtDUlfQ, pp. 103-104. 
3NeW-.YQI~~s, 10 October 1941; Conte-Porras, AtnUl.fQ, H?· 104-105. 
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Arias returned to the country for a short stay and then went into 
exile in Mexico and Central America, where he remained until 13 October 
1945. Upon his second return he held a political rally in the Plaza de 
Santa Ana. He denounced the imperialist aspirations of the United States 
and swore vengeance against those crucial to his earlier fall from 
power.1 
The years 1946 arXJ 1947 brought renewed unrest to Panama. In 1942 
President Ricardo de la Guardia had signed a treaty granting the United 
States the use of a total of 134 different base sites in the Rep.iblic 
for the duration of the war and for one year f oll<>'Ning the signing of 
the final peace agreement. In 1947 the United States requested that the 
leases be renewed on several of the sites, including the air strip at 
R!o Bato in Veraguas. Panama was in the midst of a IX>St-war depression 
and rather angry because it was the only country, with the exception of 
Argentina, that had not received lend-lease funds. And, as was mentioned 
earlier, Arnulfo Arias was back in town and very unwilling to allow his 
enemies an opJ:X>rtunity to gain the advantage.2 
When the National Assarbly began to debate the issue of the bases, 
Panamanian housewives and students-instigated by Arias-took to the 
streets. Ricardo Alfaro, who had negotiated the agreanent, switched 
sides arXi warned President Enrique A. Jimeflez that signing it would be 
suicidal. Altercations between students and the police were engineered 
by Arnulfo and Harmodio, who for reasons unknown appeared to be on most 
1conte-Porras, Am1Jlfg, W· 113-114. 
2
•Agreement with Panama for lease of Defense Sites,• DDiteCLStates 
lle~LState.J&ll.letio 23 May 1942, pp. 95-96. 
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agreeable terms. One student died and many others, including a nunber of 
policemen, were injured. Panamanians, it seemed, wanted some sort of 
economic aid to be attached to the treaty. United States efforts to sal-
vage the situation were begun too late, am the assembly rejected the pro-
posal unanimously.1 
The United States evacuated the sites, taking almost everything with 
them. Panamanians, hCYWever, did not in the least bit seem to mind; they 
had looked the great colossus of the North straight in the eye a00 had 
seen that mighty power blink. This lesson they never forgot. 2 
Behirrl the rioting of 1947 appeared a force that soon became very 
active in Panamanian politics, the student body of the nation. The 
University of Panama, arxl the home of the Federation of Panamanian stu-
dents, became a hotbed of political activism; and the Arias brothers were 
responsible to a large degree. At present the student body is still a 
political force to be reckoned with in Panama.3 
The year 1947 marked the turning point in another aspect of Pana-
ma's political life-the energence of the National Guard as political 
arbiter. On 14 February 1947, Jose Antonio (Chichi) 4 Remon cantera 
assumed the leadership of the National Guard. The reasons given for the 
1Biesanz, PeQp].e.Q, p. 195; •Renewal of Defense Agreement with 
Panama,• llnit~ates~partlrent..oLS.tate Bulletin 21 Decenber 1947, 
pp. 285-290. 
2Biesanz, P:egples, p. 196; Blackman, interviews. 
3naniel Goldrich and E!dward Scott, •0eveloping Political Orientations 
of Panamanian Students,• ~JQumgJ_gf_l?QlitikS 23 (February 1961)): 85; 
Ronald H. McDonald, F.at:t:LSyst~aod~iQDS in Latin ~Ika (Chica-
go: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), W• 79-83. 
4Translation: •Baby Face.• 
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promotion vary with the source; but President Jimtnez stated it was a 
reward for uncovering a plot by Colonel Rogelio Fctl>rega, chief of the 
National Guard, and Arnulfo Arias against the government. Mrs. Remon, how-
I 
ever, asserted it became necessary when the drunken excesses of Fabrega 
made him unable to cope with the rigors of his job. Under Ranbn the guard 
acquired tremendous political power as he seated arxl unseated presidents.1 
At this point the forces nnst significant in present-day Panamani-
an J;X>litics emerged, arXi it can be said the die was cast. The oligarchy 
returned to power during the 1950s and early 1960s but not with the 
same force as in early Panamanian history because their power was co-opted 
by the middle class, the students, and the paramilitary2 National Guard. 
Arnulfo ran for the presidency in 1948 as the candidate of the 
Partido Revolucionario Autentico (Authentic Revolutionary Party). The 
septuagenarian Domingo D!az of the Partido Liberal Nacional opposed 
Arias. Arnulfo's running mates were Daniel Chanis and Roberto F. Chiari. 
A coalition of liberal parties supp:>rted n!az.3 
Panamanians went to the polls on 9 May 1948. After the first count 
it was announced that Arias led by a margin of 1,500 votes. SuH?Qrters 
1Pippin, Xb.e..RemfD-.Eta, p. 5. 
~ Panamanian Constitution provided for an army to defend the 
country, but the army was disbanded in Noverrber 1904. After 1936 when 
the United States gave up the right to intervene in Panama City and 
Colon to maintain order, this task fell to the National Guard. Although 
prior to 1968 it was nowhere stated that the National Guard's or National 
Police's duties included the defense of the nation, it was taken for granted. 
Victor F. Goyt{a, El liheialisxro_y_la...,kQDStituki6n (Panama: La Estrella 
de Panama', 1945) P• 177. 
3conte-Porras, ArDUlfc, W· 120-122; Pippin, XruLRen'OILElih H?· 22-
23. 
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of o!az attacked the offices of the National Election Board and a group 
of thugs calling themselves pi~Lde...gue.r.ra (war path), damaged machinery 
at the headquarters of El-1?anama::Ame.ti~a. There were also instances of 
violence precipitated by the followers of Arias. Their plan to storm the 
presidential palace, however, did not succeed. Because of increased 
tension, President Enrique A. Jim~nez called the National Assembly into a 
lame duck session on 9 July 1948 to give rubber stamp approval to a 
presidential decree suspending the right to assemble arXi the freedoms of 
speech and the press.1 
This presidential action, however, backfired. In addition to the 
Jim~nez decree, the assembly passed a resolution that annulled the May 
1948 elections. By so doing they changed the status of the National Assem-
bly from a legislative body to that of a constituent assembly, ousted 
Jimtfuez, and designated a new president, Henrique de Obarrio-who just 
happened to be the brother-in-law of police chief Rem6n Cantera. The 
Constituent Assembly then reverted to its previous function after taking 
these actions. The president's term began immediately and was expected 
to continue until the next elections due in 1952. 2 
The majombjective of the National Assembly was to prevent Arias 
from assuming the presidency at all costs. The May election remained 
undecided, and anything was better than the possibility of another Arias 
dictatorship. 
At this point a power vacuum caused by a war between the two 
branches of government, President Jimenez and the National Assembly, was 
1 · · mh,... n,..~ P1i;:p1n, ~~D...EI.a, pp. 22-23. 
2Ibid., pp. 23-25. 
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/ / filled by none other than •Baby Face" Remon Cantera. Remon offered the 
support of the National Guard to President Jimenez. Once secure in his 
position, Jimenez submitted the resolution to the Supreme Court' which 
ruled in his favor, declared Jimenez the lawful president, and approved 
only the decree restricting those constitutional rights affecting the 
right to assemble aro the freedom of speech and the press. Jimfuez won 
the war and remained in office until the inauguration of Domingo Dfaz.1 
In order to allow Dfaz to assume the presidency, the National 
Election Board discarded enough Arias votes to give the former a sub-
stantial margin in the elections. On 30 July the National Election Board 
decided in the behalf of Diaz, the final count being D{az 78,212 and Arias 
75,848. D{az, a rather old, sick, and senile man, began his short and 
turbulent term of office on 1 October 1948.2 
The new president's problems began as soon as he took the oath of 
office. Half the members of the assembly boycotted the inauguration 
because they considered it illegitimate. Less than one month later an 
attempted golpe against the new regime, led by el..bambxe--wh<:1Nas 
living in exile-am brother Harmodio, was foiled by µ>lice commandant 
Rem6n. Despite the failure, Arias returned to the Isthmus as planned 
to a hero's welcome.3 
Arias' machinations, nevertheless, did not stop despite the failure 
of the first effort at overthrowing the Diaz government. The details of 
1Piwin, i'be_BelrOn_E.ta, pp. 25-26. 
2Ibid.: John Biesanz and Luke M. Smith, •Panamanian Politics," Tbe 
JautnaJ._gf-.Foliti~s 14 (August 1952): 386-402. 
24-27. 
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the Easter Plot-the attempt to remove n{az f rorn the presidency-came to 
light when an American citizen, Walter Brown, arrested for gun running 
on the Isthnus, "decided" to share his secrets with the police. Harmodio 
Arias am others were arrested, based on Brown's disclosures; and the 
National Assarbly suspended certain constitutional rights. Harmodio was 
released three months later for lack of evidence; but his son, Roberto 
•Tito• Arias, and brother, Arnulfo, were taken into custody.1 
National affairs took a dangerous turn when President Diaz sudden-
ly became ill and was hospitalized. The subsequent story should have 
been folmd only in the soap operas. Panamanians awoke every nnrning wonder-
ing who would be their next president. It was a game of presidential 
musical chairs, and Rem6n was the master fiddler. 2 
The police conmandant was the force to be reckoned with during this 
period. Born into an im[:overished branch of his family, he had acquired 
wealth and J.X>Wer while rising through the ranks of the National Guard. 
During the chaos mentioned earlier, he filled a void left by the institu-
tional political machinery. 
n{az died and his first vice-president, Daniel Chanis, replaced him. 
Chanis, however, did not remain in office very long after he challenged 
\ 
Rem0n. When Chanis tried to dismiss Rem6n after the Supreme Court de-
cided a cattle roonopoly headed by Temistocles Diaz, son of former Presi-
dent nl'az, and Remon was lll'lconstitutional, Chanis was unceremoniously 
ranoved f rorn the presidential palace by the threat of National Guard 
1Pippin, ~~a, pp. 29-30. 
2Lafeber, ~be_p~, p. 107. 
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fire}.X>Wer. 1 
The secooo vice-president, Roberto F. Chiari, replaced Chanis. Chiari, 
a cousin of Rem0n, lasted only one week. The Supreme Court decided that 
Chanis was the legitimate ruler, and Chiari accepted its decision. When 
Rem6n discovered Chiari's betrayal he gave him ten minutes to vacate the 
Presidential Palace. 2 
Then, to the wondennent of all, Rem6n chose Arnulfo Arias to replace 
Chiari. The National Election Board was called to recoWlt the 1948 bal-
lots and, although this was hard to believe, in 1949 it was able to find 
the votes that had disappeared only a couple of weeks after the elections 
a year earlier, thus declaring Arias winner of the 1948 election.3 
Rembn obviously believed he could handle Arias should the latter 
get out of hand. Arias started out by allaying the fears of everyone, 
. 
giving reassurances that his former fascist beliefs were a thing of the 
past. Even the United States Department of State was taken in by the new 
Arnulfo and in Decarber of 1949 recognized the Arias regime. 4 
Arias quickly set about building an impregnable J.X>litical machine 
with plblic funds. After forcing owners of choice coffee lands to ·sell 
out to him, he used taxpayers' iooney to build a twenty-seven-mile high-
way and bridge joining his coffee farms. This ensured his xoonopoly of 
the coffee market as he possessed other coffee plantations. He also bled 
1Lafeber, 1'he_Panama....Caoal, W• 108-109; Conte-Porras, !Inulfo, W· 124-126. 
2Pippin, The RenPn E.ra, pp. 37-39; Lafeber, ~ Panama <:anal, W· 
109-110; Conte-Porras, !IDUlfo, W· 127-128. 
3eonte-Porras, A.t:Dlll.fo, pp. 128-129. 
4 Lafeber, 1'b~, p. 111. 
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the country's bankers and developed a huge drug and gold smuggling 
venture under the management of his favorite nephew, Antonio, "the 
Druggist,• Arias.1 
Ment>ers of the op{X>sition who failed to see matters his way were 
jailed, and he established his own secret police force. In 1950 he sought 
to suspend the constitution of 1946 arxl to destroy the National Assembly 
and the Supreme Court. He then tried to established the Constitution of 
1941 once again as the supreme law of the land. The National Assembly 
responded to these efforts by impeaching the president and electing 
Alcibiades Arosemena to succeed him. Arias appealed to Remon who saw 
which way the wind was blowing and supported the assenbly. When two of 
Rem<fu•s top aides went to the National Palace to serve Arias the 
assaxbly's decision, Arias gunned the officers down on the steps. Arias 
also shot at the ambulance workers who attempted to aid the injured. Six-
teen persons died before Arnulfo was convinced by his wife of the futility 
of his efforts. On the steps of the Palacio de las Garzas, Arias, blood-
stained and weary, delivered his farewell speech: "You • • • my supporters 
have fulfilled your duties. I as chief executive have fulfilled mine." 
Then ix>inting to the guardsmen he stated: "They are traitors. • • • We 
will return1•2 He was escorted off to the ca'rcel Modelo arx:1 released after 
his trial. By unanimous vote of the National AssE:!lbly, Arias was found 
guilty of having violated the 1946 Constitution. He again left the country 
1Lafeber, Xbe_Eanana...Canal, p. 112; Pippin, Xbe RerrQ'o Era, p. 55. 
2Ibid., pp. 109-112; Conte-Porras, Ainulfo, pp. 151-155; 
Blackman, interviews. 
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and went into exile.1 
In 1964, true to his word, Arnulfo returned as a presidential 
candidate; but he was defeated by the handpicked successor of President 
Robert F. Chiari-Marco Aurelio Robles. Robles, a member of the profes-
sional middle class, attempted to refonn the inequitable tax system, 
thereby antagonizing the oligarchy. 
The elections of 1968 were also graced with Arias' candidacy. Half-
way through the election campaign the National Assercbly impeached Presi-
dent Robles, at the instigation of Arias, for showing sup[X>rt for David 
Samudio, Arnulfo's opponent. Significantly, Samudio came from the pro-
fessional middle class. The assembly named Max Del Valle, first vice--
president, to the chief executive's office. The National Guard supported 
President Robles and when the Supreme Court convened in April, it over-
turned the assenbly's decision. The president, however, was alienated 
from the oligarchy, which now gave its full backing to Arias. 2 
Panamanians elected Arias in May; and he took office on 1 October 
1968. As in 1941 he sought to emasculate the National Guard. He retired 
General Bollvar Vallarino f rcm the force by granting him a diplomatic 
post in Washington and attempted to send Qnar Torrijos, a colonel, out 
of the country as a military attache. On 11 October Arnulfo was forced 
to seek asyllllll in the canal Zone after Torrijos and Boris Mart{nez 
staged a gQJ.pe~stado. He went into exile and in 1976 advised the 
Rep.iblican Party's presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan, that the Canal 
1Piwin, Tbe_~D-Era, p. 77. 
2f;l.-EiID~-AlleI~, January-May 1968. 
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Zone was United States property. In 1978 Arias was allowed to return to 
his homeland, where he now resides a00 is still active in p:>litics. In 
fact, he ran for the presidency again in 1984 and was defeated by a mere 
handful of votes.l 
Arnulfo engineered the first successful revolt in Panama's history 
as an independent nation, so it was only fitting that this period of 
pseudo-democratic republicanism was brought to an end with a ~ un-
seating him. 
The coup of 11 October 1968, dealt a fatal blow to Panama's IX>l-
itical system. The oligarchy drove the last nail into its own coffin when 
it opposed the necessary reforms President Robles attempted to insti-
tute. The system was corrupt. Allegiances were bought and sold. Elec-
toral fraud occurred with the approval of the government in office. It 
took the actions of Arias, though, to bring about the destruction of the 
democratic p:>litical system. 
Earlier Arnulfo, along with his brother Harmodio, had paved the way 
for the middle class me.etizo to gain access to IX>litical power. Arnulfo, 
however, built an opi;x>sition to the oligarchy based on ~I~Dali.et001 
demogoguery, authoritarianism, {X>µ.tlism, nationalism, and racism. He 
failed to create a workable p:>litical party to provide J;X>tential leader-
ship and sound p:>licymaking. His power was consensual, and this alone 
provided enough basis for the making of a stable p:>litical systen.2 
Arias, however, fell into a trap similar to that of his predeces-
1NeiLJ:o.t:k~.e, 12 arx:l 13 October 1968; LiLReJ2ibli~a, 30 
Septerber 1978; ~~.tk~~' 5-10, 13, 17, 18, 31 May 1984 • 
. 
2car~ J. Fr!edrich, •Political Leadership and the Problen of the 
Charismatic Power, Xb~uinal_o!_Politi~.e 23 (February 1961): 7. 
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sors Belisario Porras and Rudolfo Chiari. These two early Panamanian 
presidents institutionalized the role of ~audilJ.igng. Arnulfo also re-
ceived this legacy fran his older brother who, although guilty of this 
sin, attempted to establish a viable political group based on the needs 
and aspirations of the comnon Panamanian. With Accioo Comunal, Harmodio 
began the makings of what could have been a political party the likes of 
which Panamanians had never seen and possibly may never be able to 
develop. Acci6n COl'Cllllal began as a coalition to represent the needs of 
the masses and served to propel Hamodio into power. 
Harmodio used the group to stage the coup of 1931; in so doing he 
set a very dangerous precedent. The presidency was no longer inviolate. 
Whenever Panamanians became dissatisfied with the president they no longer 
waited until the end of his term in office; they simply requested that he 
vacate the off ice. This was done with or without the use of force. 
Arnulfo later formed the pgnamenista party with basically the same 
class of people as Accion Comunal. The party survived several decades,~ 
whereas many other parties did not. Panamanian political parties were 
formed largely from one election to another and were very unstable. The 
~ta party, however, represented the egotistical aspirations of 
one power-hl.mgry individual and his cronies. John Biesanz and Luke M. 
Smith believe that •the characteristic function of Panamanian politics 
is to distribute among the powerholders aIXl their followers a sutply of 
goods and services rather than expand this supply.•l Arias did exactly 
that. He never sought to enforce a workable i;olicy for obtaining job 
1Biesanz arii Smith, •Panamanian Politics," p. 386. 
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outlets for the growing middle class outside of dispossessing foreigners 
of their livelihood. Neither did he attempt to recruit new blood from 
among the country's young intellectuals in order to provide continuity 
for the electoral system.I 
Arnulfo, despite his shortcomings, advanced the cause of the middle 
class. Presently it forms the largest part of the political sector and 
holds p:>wer through the National Guard. All the leaders of the 
National Guard.came fran the middle class; and those that served in the 
presidency, named to that i;x:>sition by the leader of the Guard, came from 
the same sector. These chances for a marber of the middle class to 
gain a {X>Sition in government were greatly enhanced by Arias. 
The price paid, however, was great. Political consensus in Panama 
is not gained from a relationship between the people and their leaders 
based on trust, respect, and the knowledge that their need for political 
power, personal freedom, and financial advancement will be met, if only 
to some extent. Consensus comes as a result of the need to •conform 
because of their fear of not securing what can be given or withheld."2 
Panamanians conformed to their leaders, past and more so present, 
because at times they faced the prospect of being p:>werless over their 
destinies. Arias in 1941 curtailed the power, freedom, and financial 
advancement of those he did not consider to be true Panamanians. After 
October 1968 this became a fact for almost all Panamanians. 
1Biesanz arx1 Smith, •Panamanian Politics,• p. 386. 
2Goldrich and Scott, •Political Orientations,• p. 667. 
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The right to choose their leaders was forfeited with the golpe that 
brought the National Guard to power. They also lost control over their 
freedom to walk the streets without being subjected to the whims of any 
individual guardsman. This lasted for several years after the golpe. 
Individuals paid their fines without bothering to dispute the validity 
of the charges pressed by the police. There was not the recourse to a 
court system because that is only available in a democratic society. The 
political system was at its nadir. It was the result of years of abuse.1 
Arias' failure also extended to the economic aspect of life in 
Panama. He became a member of the moneyed upper class and forgot his own 
humble beginnings and those of his major supporters. Though he made ef-
forts to redistribute the {X>Ssession of land, Arias gained from it far 
more than anyone else. Agrarian reform did not become a fact of life in 
Panama. Arias, as a result of his several presidencies, became one of 
the largest land owners in the province of Penonom<£. 
In the area of race relations some progress was made. Members of 
minority groups living in Panama who survived the upheaval of the for-
ties assimilated themselves into the life of the country and adopted the 
language. Their children became a part of the nationalistic drive of 
the 1960s and 1970s. This did not mean, however, that there was no 
more discrimination against these groups. An example of this assimila-
tion is F.c:ruardo Charles, the son of West Indian blacks, who became very 
active in local politics during the 1950s and 1960s. He served as mayor 
of Panama City from 1960 to 1961. Unfortunately, however, the progress 
1charles, interviews. 
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made in the area of race relations was overshadowed by another failure-
the continuation of nei;x>tism. 
The political era that drew to a close in 1968 did not end nepo-
tism. The leadership of the nation, though transferred into the hands of 
the pa.ramilitary, did not abolish former irresponsible methods used to 
choose individuals for high government offices. Omar Torrijos was es-
pecially guilty of this shortcoming. 
Despite these negative aspects of EX>litical life, there were some 
areas of success, mainly the establishment of the caja de Segura Social 
am the sense of pride the aver age Panamanian acquired through the ef-
forts of Arias and his brother. The Caja de Segura Social was formed by 
Arnulfo Arias to provide a heal th system for the nation funded by em-
ployer contributions. Presently, however, the system is overcrowded and 
care is very difficult to obtain. 
Panamanians lacked a sense of national pride prior to the efforts 
of Arias. There was no feeling of a need to unite as one to gain de-
mands from, for example, the United States. The Panamanian nation was 
divided. One i;x>litical faction often invoked Article 136, which provided 
for United States intervention in Panama in the event of disturbances, 
in order to remain in i;:x:>wer. It did not matter that their native soil 
was violated by foreign troops. The main objective of the party in power 
was to quell the rebellion of the opposition and maintain its position of 
leadership. This ended with Harmodio Arias. Arnulfo then built on this 
issue of national pride when he opposed the arming of 
Panamanian ships during the World War II. Later he fomented the riots 
that ended United States occupation of military installations outside of 
the canal Zone following World War II. It can be said that the culmination 
36 
of his efforts came with the renegotiation of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
; 
Treaty in 1977. Panamanians now look forward to the day when they will 
obtain canplete control of their country's landmass. Arnulfo Arias, though 
indirectly, was res1xmsible because he sparked the sense of nationalism 
that finally led to the signing of the 1977 agreement. 
The presidencies of Arias were very short-lived, but their impact 
was not. His effect on the nation's political system-the instability, 
the immaturity of the party system, and the subsequent military rule.--
affected the course of the country's history. Arias had the opportunity 
to prevent these. He had the supi;x:>rt of the whole nation. Instead he 
became involved with advancing his own cause and personal wealth. In 
doing so be failed himself arXl his country. 
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President Arnulfo Arias arx1 wife surrendering after a shoot-out that 
left several national guardsmen dead, 10 May 1951. 
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Ex-president Arias defends his actions at his impeachment trial. 
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Dum!l (M.ieo. o. r. > 
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A dejected President Roberto F. Chiari forced out of the Presidential 
Palace after less than a week in office. 
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